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Abstract 
 
It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish 
self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the 
sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely 
depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and 
actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the 
presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact 
the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, 
participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated 
sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the 
sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and 
actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the 
intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the 
predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I 
am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self 
are mutually independent. 
 
keywords: Forward model; Motor awareness; Sense of agency; Sense of ownership; 
Self-recognition  
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Introduction 
 
When we act, we normally feel ourselves causing our own actions. It appears too 
self-evident to require further investigation. If I say “I think it is a beautiful day today”, I could 
be wrong about the weather. But it seems that I could not be wrong about the “I”. I could not 
misidentify myself when I state that it is I who am thinking (Wittgenstein, 1958). Such use of 
the first-person pronoun is thought to be immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker, 
1984). However, certain schizophrenic experiences including auditory hallucination, thought 
insertion and delusions of control could be counterexamples to the immunity principle. Auditory 
hallucinations typically consist of hearing spoken voices, which were misattributed to external 
force by patients although in fact they themselves spoke. The essence of delusions of control is 
that patient experiences his or her will as replaced by that of some other agency or force. In 
other terms the patient feels that he or she is not at the origin of his or her own acts. A 
schizophrenic patient who suffers from thought insertion might claim that he or she is not the 
one who is thinking a particular thought, when in fact he or she is the one who is thinking the 
thought. These symptoms are in common characterized by an inability to distinguish self- and 
externally produced actions. 
Based on a established model of motor learning and control (Wolpert, 1997), Frith 
proposed that abnormalities in forward model might underlie these symptoms (Frith, 1992; Frith, 
Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000). To optimize motor control and learning, the central nervous 
system has been thought to require containing internal models, which represent aspects of one’s 
own body and its interaction with the external world. There are two types of internal model: 
inverse model and forword model (Wolpert, Ghahramani & Jordan, 1995). The inverse model 
provides the motor commands necessary to achieve a certain goal based on the desired state. By 
contrast, the forward model makes predictions about the behavior of the motor system and its 
sensory consequences. Predictions can be used in several ways. First, prediction of the actual 
outcome of motor command can be compared with the desired outcome. This comparison 
enables rapid error correction before sensory feedback is available (Greenwald, 1970). Second, 
when a movement is made, an efference copy of the motor command is used to make a 
prediction of the sensory consequences of the movement. This sensory prediction can then be 
compared with the actual sensory feedback from the movement. This prediction can be used to 
anticipate and cancel the sensory effects of movement, as in the case during eye movements 
(Helmholtz, 1867). More importantly, this prediction can also used to attenuate the sensory 
effect of self-generated movement and thereby enables differentiating self-produced sensation 
form externally generated sensations. Self-produced sensations can be correctly predicted from 
motor commands. As a result, there will be little or no sensory discrepancy resulting from the 
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comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. This accurate prediction can be 
used to attenuate the sensory effects of self-produced movement. In contrast, externally 
generated sensations are not associated with any efference copy and cannot be predicted by the 
forward model. As a result this comparison will produce a higher level of sensory discrepancy. 
As the discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensations increases, so does the likelihood 
that the sensation is externally produced. According to Frith, using such a mechanism, it is 
possible to distinguish self-generated actions from actions produced by other agents.  
Consistent with Frith’s hypothesis, Weiskrantz, Elliott and Darlington (1971) 
reported that participants rated the self-administered tactile stimulus as less tickly than the same 
tactile stimulus generated externally. Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith (1998) using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging showed a reduction in activity of the secondary somatosensory 
cortex and the anterior cingulate gyrus when the tactile stimulus was self-produced relative to 
when it was externally produced. However, schizophrenic patients with auditory hallucinations 
or delusions of control did not show a decrease in their perceptual ratings for tactile stimuli 
produced by themselves as compared with those produced by the experimenter (Blakemore, 
Smith, Steel, Johnstone & Frith, 2000). The same goes for other modalities. Curio, Neuloh, 
Numminen, Jousmaki and Hari (2000) using magnetoencephalography showed that 
responsiveness of the auditory cortex to vowel sounds was reduced when participants spoke 
them compared with when they were listening to the sound played back. Again, it was reported 
that schizophrenic patients did not exhibit normal reduction of the response in the auditory 
cortex to self-generated vowel sounds compared to the same sounds played back (Ford, 
Mathalon, Heinks, Kalba, Faustman & Roth, 2001). 
Recently, Gallagher (2000) has proposed that self-consciousness can be divided 
into two important aspects: the “minimal self” and the “narrative self”. The former is defined as 
a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. The latter 
involves personality identity and continuity across time. The “minimal self” includes the sense 
of self-agency, that is the sense that “I am the one who is causing or generating an action”, and 
the sense of self-ownership, or the sense that “I am the one who is undergoing an experience”. 
The purpose of the present studies was to directly investigate whether the prediction of the 
sensory consequence of actions made by forward model would modulate the sense of 
self-agency. If the sense of self-agency depends on a comparison between the predicted and 
actual sensory consequences, participants should misattribute self-produced tones to an external 
force when the actual feedback is discrepant with the prediction (Experiment 1). On the contrary, 
participants should experience the illusionary sense of self-agency when there is little or no 
discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory feedback, even if in fact an experimenter 
produces them (Experiment 2). Moreover, the sense of self-agency should rely on a comparison 
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between the prediction made by forward model and the actual sensory consequence, rather than 
on a comparison between the intended and actual sensory feedback (Experiment 3). 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Previous studies demonstrated that both tickliness rating and action recognition, i.e., 
judgment of whether the movement that participants saw was their own, were affected by 
angular deviation and temporal delay between action and its consequences (Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999; Franck, Farrer, Georgieff, Marie-Cardine, Dalréy, d’Amato, & Jeannerod, 2001). 
In Experiment 1, we directly investigated whether the degree of congruency between the 
predicted and actual sensory feedback modulated the sense of self-agency. The degree of 
congruency was manipulated in terms of stimulus types and temporal delay. Moreover, we also 
examined whether the sense of self-ownership varied with the degree of congruency between 
the predicted and actual sensory feedback.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen healthy right-handed volunteers participated in this study. Participants were 
eight males and eight females raging in age from 21 to 35 years, with a mean age of 23.8 years 
(SD＝ 2.61 years). None had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All participants 
gave written informed consent, but were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. 
Design 
The design in Experiment 1 had two within-participants factors: types of stimulus 
(congruent or incongruent tone with prediction), and temporal delay (0 ms delay, 200 ms delay, 
400 ms delay, or 600 ms delay from the timing predicted). 
Procedure 
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were led to a cubicle and seated in front 
of a computer screen with a pair of headphone. Prior to the experiment, participants performed 
300 learning trials to learn the relationship between action and its consequence. Participants 
were told to press the left button with the left index finger and the right button with the right 
index finger in turn. After each button press, a certain tone was immediately presented for 200 
ms through in-ear headphones: a 600 Hz tone or a 1000 Hz tone. The assignment of tones to 
buttons was consistent for each participant and counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
were explicitly told that each button pressing would evoke a certain tone. Tones were identical 
in duration and sound pressure throughout the experiment. 
In Experiment 1, participants made self-paced button press and heard one of which 
 6 
tones had followed button presses in the learning session. Under congruent tone condition, each 
button press evoked the same tone that had followed each button press in the learning session. 
By contrast, under incongruent tone condition, the different tone from prediction followed each 
button press. Under delay conditions, the congruency was manipulated in terms of stimulus 
timing. Participants received 8 trials per a condition. After each trial, participants were asked to 
answer two items from “totally disagree” (score ＝0) to “totally agree” (score ＝100). The 
sense of self-agency was assessed by the first item that “I was the one who produced the tone”, 
and the sense of self-ownership was assessed by the second item that “I was the one who was 
listening to the tone”. Prior to the rating, participants were told that there were two cases: in one 
case they might hear tones as a result of their button press, but in another case the experimenter 
might produce the tones. Under a control condition, participants passively listened to two tones. 
The trials were presented in random order. The mean rating score of 8 trials in the same 
condition was used as dependant variables. 
To control the increase in TypeⅠerror, the degree of freedom was adjusted using 
the Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) coefficient when appropriate. Post hoc tests were computed 
according to the LSD test at a probability level of 5%. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The rating scores on the sense of self-agency were analyzed using a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with two factors (Tone congruency × Delay). This 
analysis revealed a main effect of tone congruency, F(1,15) ＝9.50, p< .01, and a main effect of 
delay, F(2.39,35.77) ＝ 20.97, p< .0001. But there wasn’t an interaction between tone 
congruency and delay, F(2.32,34.84) ＝0.64, n.s.. The main effect of tone congruency was 
caused by higher scores when actual and predicted tones were congruent (M＝ 71.88, 
SEM=3.55) than incongruent (M＝56.25, SEM=5.96). On the delay effect the sense of 
self-agency was significantly reduced as the delay from the timing predicted increased (Ms 
(SEMs) ＝ 87.50(2.96), 66.88(4.76), 55.31(5.92), vs. 46.56(6.99), respectively). Under the 
control condition, the sense of self-agency was rated as 0 by all participants, which suggests that 
acting makes an important contribution to the sense of self-agency. Without movement, there 
was no prediction made by forward model on the basis of motor command, which caused a lack 
of attenuation of sensations. Thus, it was very easy for participants to judge the tones as 
externally produced. In Experiment 1, although the tones were actually produced as a 
consequence of their actions in the all conditions except the control condition, the sense of 
self-agency was reduced in the condition in which self-produced tones were unpredictable in 
terms of timing and frequency. In contrast, on the sense of self-ownership, all participants 
scored 100 in all the conditions. Taken together, these results suggest that the predictability of 
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the sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but does not always 
affect the sense of self-ownership. Results are summarized in Fig.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 1, we showed that as the discrepancy between the predicted and 
actual sensory feedback increased, participants were more likely to misattribute self-generated 
tones to an external source. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether 
participants experienced the sense of self-agency when externally generated sensations 
happened to match the prediction made by forward model. If such a phenomena of illusion of 
sense of self-agency occurs, we can suggest that the sense of self-agency strongly depends on 
congruency between the predicted and actual feedback. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ten healthy right-handed volunteers participated in this study. Participants were 
five males and five females ranging from 22 to 29 years, with a mean age of 22.7 (SD＝ 2.18 
years). None had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All participants gave written 
informed consent for participation in the experiment. 
Design 
The design in Experiment 2 had three within-participants factors: actual agency 
(self or other), types of stimulus (congruent or incongruent tone with prediction), and temporal 
delay (0 ms delay, 200 ms delay, 400 ms delay, or 600 ms delay from the timing predicted). 
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Fig. 1. Mean (±SEM) rating scores of self-agency in each condition, Experiment 1. 
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Procedure 
In Experiment 2, we attempted to make a situation in which the timing of 
presentation of externally generated tone happened to match the prediction based on motor 
command. For that purpose, we used a choice reaction time task (see below). Upon entering the 
laboratory, participants were led to a cubicle and seated in front of a computer screen with a pair 
of headphone. Prior to the experiment, participants performed 300 learning trials to learn 
relationship among stimulus, action and its consequence. Each trial began with a fixation point 
presented for 500 ms, which was then replaced by the target stimulus. Participants were told to 
press the left button with the left index finger whenever a red square appeared on the screen and 
the right button with the right index finger whenever a blue square appeared on the screen as 
quickly and accurately as possible. The target stimuli remained on the screen until participants 
responded. After each button press, a certain tone was immediately presented for 200 ms 
through in-ear headphones: a 600 Hz tone or a 1000 Hz tone. The assignment of stimulus and 
tones to buttons was consistent for each participant and counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were explicitly told that each button pressing would evoke a certain tone. Tones 
were identical in duration and sound pressure throughout the experiment. The learning session 
consisted of 150 red square trials and 150 blue square trials. The trials were presented in random 
order. 
In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to press the left button with the index 
finger of the left hand after the red square appeared and the right button with the index finger of 
the right hand after the blue square appeared as quickly and accurately as possible in the same 
way as the learning session. After each response, participants heard one of which tones had 
followed button presses in the learning session. Under the other agency conditions, the tones 
were presented a certain ms after the presentation of target stimuli. Based on a mean reaction 
time in the learning session, the inter-stimulus interval between the onset of target stimulus and 
the onset of tone was individually adjusted to correspond to prediction. By using this procedure, 
the timing of tone presentation occasionally corresponded to the prediction made by forward 
model, although each tone was presented irrespective of participant’s response. After each 
response a reaction time was checked. And then, only trials in which a reaction time was 
ranging from 0 ms to +15 ms of the mean reaction time in the learning session were accepted 
for analysis. The other conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. Trials continued until 
sample numbers reached 8 trials per a condition. Additionally, participants received 8 control 
trials, in which they passively listened to two tones. Immediately after each trial, participants 
were asked to answer the same items as used in Experiment 1. The trials were presented in 
random order. The mean rating score of 8 trials in the same condition was used as dependant 
variables. Data were analyzed in the same method as Experiment 1. 
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Results and Discussion 
The rating scores on the sense of self-agency were analyzed using a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three factors (Actual agency ×  Tone 
congruency × Delay). This analysis revealed a main effect of tone congruency, F(1,9) ＝7.65, 
p< .05, and a main effect of delay, F(1.44,12.96) ＝18.33, p< .0001. But there was no 
significant main effect of actual agency, F(3,45) ＝0.13, n.s.. None of the other terms in this 
analysis reached significance. The main effect of tone congruency was caused by higher scores 
when actual and predicted tones were congruent (M＝55.06, SEM=6.06) than incongruent (M
＝40.25, SEM=6.59). On the delay effect the sense of self-agency was significantly reduced as 
the delay from the timing predicted increased (Ms (SEMs)＝ 81.25(5.09), 47.63(6.56), 
37.50(8.53), vs. 24.25(9.33), respectively). Under the control condition, the sense of self-agency 
was rated as 0 by all participants. On the sense of self-ownership of experience, all participants 
scored 100 in all the conditions. Results are summarized in Fig.2. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, participants misattributed self-generated tones to an 
external source when actual sensory feedbacks did not match predictions. In contrast, 
participants misjudged externally generated tones as their own generated when there happened 
to be little or no sensory discrepancy resulting from the comparison between the predicted and 
actual feedback. Taken together, these results suggest that the sense of self-agency largely 
depends on discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 1 and 2, participants executed intended actions, and there was no 
discrepancy between intended and actual responses. Therefore, it remained unresolved whether 
the sense of self-agency was build on the comparison between the sensory prediction made by 
forward model and actual sensory feedback or on the comparison between intended and actual 
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Fig. 2. Mean (±SEM) rating scores of self-agency in each condition, Experiment 2. 
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consequence. In Experiment 3, we examined which of them contributed to the sense of 
self-agency by separating intended response from actual response. Participants performed a 
letter version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), which is a choice reaction 
time task in which the target letter is flanked by distractor letters. These flankers can be 
associated with either the same response (i.e., congruent) as the target or the opposite response 
(i.e., incongruent). It is well known that when participants are instructed to respond quickly to 
such incongruent stimulus arrays, they tend to make many errors (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, 
Eriksen & Donchin, 1985). Whereas such errors are unintended responses, actual responses are 
congruent with intentions in correct responses. If the sense of self-agency is reduced whenever 
participants commit errors, it turns out to be that the recognition of oneself as the agent of an 
action depends on the comparison between intended and actual sensory consequence. However, 
if there is no significant decline in the sense of self-agency, it is suggested that they are build on 
the comparison between the sensory prediction made by an internal forward model of the motor 
system and the actual sensory feedback. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen healthy right-handed volunteers participated in this study. Participants were 
seven males and nine females ranging from 21 to 35 years, with a mean age of 23.8 (SD＝ 3.05 
years). None had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease. All participants gave written 
informed consent for participation in the experiment. 
Design 
The design in Experiment 3 had three within-participants factors: congruency 
between intended and actual responses (correct response or error response), types of stimulus 
(congruent or incongruent tone with prediction), and temporal delay (0 ms delay, or 400 ms 
delay from the timing predicted). 
Procedure and materials 
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were led to a cubicle and seated in front 
of a computer screen with a pair of headphone. Prior to the experiment, participants performed 
300 learning trials. On each trial, 500 ms after fixation onset, the target stimulus (i.e., “H” or 
“N”) was presented for 100 ms on the center of the screen. Participants were told to press the 
left button with the left index finger as quickly and accurately as possible whenever a “H” 
appeared on the center of the screen and the right button with the right index finger whenever a 
“N” appeared on the screen. After each button press, a certain tone was immediately presented 
for 200 ms through in-ear headphones: a 600 Hz tone or a 1000 Hz tone. The assignment of 
stimulus and tones to buttons was consistent for each participant and counterbalanced across 
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participants. Participants were explicitly told that each button pressing would evoke a certain 
tone. Tones were identical in duration and sound pressure throughout the experiment. The 
learning session contained 150 trials with each of the two possible stimuli. The trials were 
presented in random order. 
In Experiment 3, each trial started with the onset centrally presented fixation sign. 
Five hundred milliseconds after fixation onset, a five-letter array (i.e., HHHHH, NNNNN, 
HHNHH, or NNHNN) was presented for 100 ms. Participants were instructed to respond to one 
of the two target letter (central H or N) with one finger and to the other letter with the other 
finger as quickly as possible and not to correct their responses even if they made errors. The 
assignment of responding finger to target letter was the same as the learning session and 
counterbalanced across participants. Immediately after each trial, participants were asked 
whether the preceding response was correct or error. There are at least two types of actual 
errors: unintended response and unnoticed error. In unnoticed error, participants might intend to 
give that response which was actually false but they believed to be correct. Analysis was 
conducted only on unintended responses that participants correctly judged as errors. Trials 
continued until each participant committed at least 4 unintended responses and made at least 4 
correct responses, which were correctly judged as correct, per a condition except the response 
factor. Additionally, participants received 4 control trials in which they passively listened to two 
tones. After each trial, participants were asked to answer the same items as used in Experiment 1. 
The trials were presented in random order. The mean rating score of 4 trials in the same 
condition was used as dependant variables. Data were analyzed in the same manner as 
Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The rating scores on the sense of self-agency were analyzed using a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three factors (Congruency between intended and 
actual responses × Tone congruency × Delay). This analysis revealed a main effect of tone 
congruency, F(1,15) ＝69.36, p< .0001, and a main effect of delay, F(1,15) ＝35.80, p< .0001. 
But there was no significant main effect of congruency between intended and actual responses, 
F(1,15) ＝2.36, n.s.. The main effect of tone congruency was caused by higher scores when 
actual and predicted tones were congruent (M＝66.73, SEM=5.84) than incongruent (M＝18.65, 
SEM=3.67). The main effect of delay was caused by higher scores under the 0 ms delay 
condition (M＝59.02, SEM=4.65) than under the 400 ms delay condition (M＝26.37, 
SEM=4.91). ANOVA also revealed the following significant interactions: Congruency between 
intended and actual responses × Tone congruency (F(1,15) = 10.19, p< .01), and Congruency 
between intended and actual responses × Delay (F(1,15) = 5.96, p< .05). None of the other 
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interactions reached significance. Post-hoc analysis revealed that under the tone congruent 
condition the sense of self-agency was significantly higher when intended and actual responses 
were congruent (M＝73.42, SEM=4.33) than incongruent ( M＝60.05, SEM=8.16) , whereas 
under the tone incongruent condition there was no significant effect of congruency between 
intended and actual responses (congruent condition: M＝17.81, SEM=3.72; incongruent 
condition: M＝19.50, SEM=4.00). Post-hoc analysis also revealed that under the 0 ms delay 
condition the sense of self-agency was significantly higher when intended and actual responses 
were congruent (M＝65.28, SEM=3.11) than incongruent (M＝52.76, SEM=6.88) , whereas 
under the 400 ms delay condition there was no significant effect of congruency between 
intended and actual responses (congruent condition: M＝25.95, SEM=4.97; incongruent 
condition: M＝26.79, SEM=5.66). Under the control condition, the sense of self-agency was 
rated as 0 by the all the participants. On the sense of self-ownership, all the participants scored 
100 in all the conditions. Results are summarized in Fig.3. 
In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a 
discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequence irrespective of correct or 
error response. Without a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequence, 
the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the intended and 
actual sensory consequence. However, even under the error condition, participants experienced 
more or less the sense of self-agency if the actual sensory consequence was congruent with the 
prediction based on motor command, although most of them spontaneously admitted that they 
could not control their own responses and its consequences. These results suggest that the sense 
of self-agency depends on a comparison between intention and actual consequences of 
movements but does not totally depend on it. Rather, it seems that the sense of self-agency 
might mainly depend on a comparison between the predicted and actual consequences of actions. 
Consistent with this suggestion, schizophrenia patients with delusions of control had no 
difficulty correcting error on the basis of sensory feedback about limb positions, although they 
failed to make rapid error corrections based on a comparison between intended and predicted 
limb positions (Frith & Done, 1989). This result suggests that schizophrenic patients with such a 
symptom have no problem with motor control based on a comparison of intended movement 
and sensory feedback. Nonetheless, they remain convinced that they are under the control of 
aliens forces. Thus, this result supports the notion that the sense of self-agency does not totally 
rely on a comparison of the intended and actual sensory feedback. In fact, in most cases the very 
same actions that the patient feels controlled by aliens forces are not discrepant with his or her 
intentions. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The ability to recognize oneself as the agent of a behavior is one way by which self 
builds as an entity independent from the external world. Without the ability to attribute a 
behavior to its proper agent, social communication could not be properly established. In the 
present paper, we investigated whether the degree of discrepancy between the predicted and 
actual feedback affected such a basic aspect of self-consciousness. In Experiment 1, participants 
made self-paced button press and heard one of which tones had followed button presses in the 
learning session. The sense of self-agency, that was the sense that “it is I who am producing the 
tone”, was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and 
its frequency, although in fact the tone was produced by participant. In Experiment 2, the 
opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced the sense of self-agency 
when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward 
model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy 
between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a 
discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, 
when there was no movement as in the control condition, all participants correctly judged the 
tones as externally produced. 
In a seminal paper, Daprati, Franck, Georgieff, Proust, Pacherie, Dalery and 
Jeannerod (1997) compared groups of normal controls and of schizophrenic patients with or 
without hallucinations or delusions of control, when required to make judgements about the 
origin of action. In their study, participants saw on a television screen a hand that is either their 
own or the experimenter’s performing movements that were either congruent or incongruent 
with the participant’s own hand movement. The task for the participants was to determine 
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Fig. 3. Mean (±SEM) rating scores of self-agency in each condition, Experiment 3. 
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whether the moving hand seen on the screen was theirs or not. Using this paradigm, Daprati et 
al. (1997) showed that when normal participants and schizophrenic patients saw the 
experimenter’s hand performing a different movement they correctly denied seeing their own 
hand regardless of presence or absence of symptoms. By contrast, when they saw the 
experimenter’s hand performing the same movement, even normal participants misjudged the 
hand as theirs in about 30% cases. The error rate amounted to 80% in the patients with delusions 
of control or 77% in the patients with hallucinations, whereas in the patients without 
hallucinations, it was around 50%. In this condition, participants had to use as cues slight 
differences in timing and kinematic pattern between the predicted and actual feedback in order 
to give the correct response. Provided schizophrenic patients with hallucinations or delusions of 
control have deficit in making a prediction of the sensory consequences of motor command, 
they will be unable to detect a discrepancy between their predicted movements and actually 
presented feedback, leading to increase of error rate. Recently, Daprati and Sirigu (2002) using 
the similar paradigm developed by Daprati et al. (1997) showed that the ability to correctly 
attribute a movement to its proper agent was reduced when participants were asked to recognize 
the non-preferred hand. These results indicate that the sense of self-agency is affected by 
asymmetries similar to those present in motor skills, thus suggesting that the system responsible 
for the sense of self-agency is profoundly nested within the mechanisms controlling motor 
production. 
The results of the present study also add evidence to the common-coding theory. In 
the common-coding theory, it is assumed that actions are coded in terms of perceivable effects 
that they should generate (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Knoblich & Flach, 
2003). According to this theory, it follows that one can distinguish between self- and 
other-generated actions based on the differential activation of the common codes. In many cases, 
people have different way of performing actions, for example, walking, throwing, drawing and 
so on. Because the observed events is more similar to the common codes when one perceives 
one’s own past actions, these codes should be more activated when observing one’s own past 
actions and their consequences than when observing others’. Knoblich and Prinz (2001) 
demonstrated that participants could recognize the kinematics of one’s own handwriting based 
on velocity information, in which there were inter-individual differences. By contrast, if the 
other person performs the observed actions in a similar way as one would perform, one might 
misattribute externally generated effects to one’s own generated, as shown in Experiment 2. 
Taken together, these results further support the notion that the action system makes a great 
contribution to self-recognition. 
An important question for future research concerns the neural basis of the sense of 
self-agency. Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck and Jeannerod (1999) using the paradigm 
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developed by Daprati et al. (1997) showed that patients with left parietal lesions, who failed to 
simulate hand actions mentally (Sirigu, Duhamel, Cohen, Pillon, Dubois & Agid, 1996), were 
more impaired in correctly identifying the viewed hand as experimenter’s hand than controls, 
only when they saw the experimenter’s hand performing the same movement as their owns. The 
left inferior parietal cortex is activated when participants simulate actions from their own 
perspectives, and when participants imitate someone else’s action, whereas the right 
homologous region is more activated when participants mentally simulate actions from someone 
else’s perspectives, and when they observe their own actions being imitated by another person 
(Ruby & Decety, 2001; Decety, Chaminade, Grezes & Meltzoff, 2002). Furthermore, 
overactivity of the right inferior parietal cortex was observed in schizophrenic patients with 
delusions of control when they experienced their acts as being under alien control (Spence, 
Brooks, Hirsch, Liddle, Meehan & Grasby, 1997). These results suggest that the inferior parietal 
lobe is profoundly involved in producing a sense of self-agency. There is accumulating evidence 
that the cerebellum is also involved in the distinction between self-produced and externally 
produced actions. For example, Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith (1999) demonstrated that activity 
in the thalamus, the primary somatosensory cortex, and the secondary somatosensory cortex 
showed a significant regression on activity in the cerebellum when tactile stimuli were 
self-produced but not when they were externally produced. Forward model was proposed to be 
stored in the cerebellar cortex (Imamizu, Miyauchi, Tamada, Sasaki, Takino, Pütz, Yoshioka & 
Kawato, 2000). Consistent with this proposal, activity in the lateral cerebellar cortex increased 
as the degree of the discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory feedback increased 
(Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 2001). Future research is required to directly investigate the joint 
contribution of the inferior parietal cortex and the cerebellum to the production of the sense of 
self-agency. 
In the present studies a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had 
no effects on the sense of self-ownership. At first glance, these results seem to be incongruent 
with the results using action recognition task. For instance, van den Bos and Jeannerod (2002) 
demonstrated that participants had difficulty in judging whether the hand that participants saw 
was theirs or not when they were not acting. This result suggests that participants may judge the 
owners of body based on the prediction of forward model, if they are acting. Without action, 
participants could not use the prediction of forward model as cues to judge the owner of body, 
which make action recognition more difficult. However, experience includes both active and 
passive ones. In passive experience, there is no prediction made by forward model. Even in such 
a case, normal participants clearly experienced the sense of ownership although they never 
experienced the sense of self-agency. Consistent with these results, patients showing anarchic 
hand sign never deny that their hands belong to themselves, although they feel their hands not 
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under their control (Banks, Short, Martinez, Latchaw, Ratcliff, & Boller, 1989). It seems quite 
plausible that patients can experience the sense of self-ownership of body based on 
proprioception that unambiguously pertains to them. These evidences suggest that although in 
the normal experience of willed action the self-agency and the sense of self-ownership coincide 
and appear indistinguishable, both may be partly independent and have different processes by 
which each of them is constructed. On the sense of self-ownership of the body, Botvinick and 
Cohen (1998) positioned a life-sized rubber hand in front of participant, while their real hand 
was hidden by a screen from the participant’s view. Then, tactile stimulation was applied 
simultaneously to the real hand and the rubber hand at which participant was required to be 
looking. After several minutes, participants experienced an illusion in which they felt the touch 
at the locus of the rubber hand, not of their real hand. In addition, participants even experienced 
the rubber hand as belonging to themselves. These results suggest that in passive experience the 
intermodal matching between vision, touch and proprioception contributes to the sense of 
self-ownership, although vision plays a predominant role over other senses in self-recognition. 
Future research must be conducted to prove the validity of such a suggestion. 
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